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ACCEPTING CONTESTED MEANINGS
Bernadette Meyler*
INTRODUCTION
One claim that has both fueled originalism and spawned multiple
objections to its very possibility is the contention that, if original meaning is
to retain any significance at all in the present, it must be determinate.
Without determinacy, some argue, originalism cannot solve the problem
that it was aimed at addressing: the so-called “countermajoritarian
difficulty,” or the notion that judicial review functions as an undemocratic
element within the U.S. political system because it permits unelected judges
to controvert the will of legislative majorities. And yet, as many have
pointed out, ascertaining determinate meanings often proves to be an
elusive goal within the constitutional context. This problem is rendered
even more pronounced when one takes into account what I have tried to
identify elsewhere as the contested meanings of common law clauses within
the Constitution.1 These phrases often sound like terms of art, which a
reader or ratifier might assume possessed a specialized meaning within the
legal community. The practices of legal communities differed among the
colonies and states and even within them. Legal actors themselves
recognized local and English variants of these practices. Rather than simply
accepting what appears to have been the majority interpretation of such
common law terms, throwing one’s hands up in despair, or moving
immediately to constitutional construction in light of the interpretive
situation, I contend here that we should uncover these disparate meanings
and perform our contemporary interpretations of constitutional clauses in
ways that resonate with them.
Over the past few decades, originalist theories of constitutional
interpretation have arguably presented the most compelling solution to what
Alexander Bickel identified in 1962 as the “counter-majoritarian
difficulty.”2 As Bickel eloquently stated the relevant problem:

* Professor of Law and Deane F. Johnson Faculty Scholar, Stanford Law School. I am
grateful to Matthew Smith, Aziz Rana, Mike Dorf, Larry Solum, and Will Partlett, as well as
participants in The New Originalism in Constitutional Law Symposium at Fordham
University School of Law for comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1. See generally Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 551 (2006) (elaborating historically and theoretically upon the variety of common law
glosses available for a number of constitutional provisions).
2. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962).
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[N]othing can finally depreciate the central function that is assigned in
democratic theory and practice to the electoral process; nor can it be
denied that the policy-making power of representative institutions, born of
the electoral process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the system.
Judicial review works counter to this characteristic.3

Originalists have attempted to solve the difficulty by insisting that judges
are not simply imposing their own elite views of what the Constitution
should mean or what rights should look like upon a reluctant populace who
would prefer a different politics, but instead are enforcing an agreement that
commands the support of “the people” or, at least, of a supermajority, and
that, therefore, should outweigh majoritarian expediencies in the present.
Phrased in these general terms, originalism has commanded the
allegiance of both liberals like Bruce Ackerman and conservatives like
Justice Antonin Scalia. One of the principal differences between the camps
as represented by Ackerman and Justice Scalia consists in the account of
when change has occurred at the level of the Constitution; whereas Justice
Scalia would always—at least in principle—look back to the moment of the
Founding or the time of ratification of a constitutional amendment,
Ackerman insists that periods like the New Deal allow for extratextual
constitutional amendment by a plebiscitary president and his influence on
the judiciary.4 In creating a typology of liberal responses to the
countermajoritarian difficulty, Nimer Sultany recently divided the
possibilities into two general camps—those characterized by a “Discourse
of Unity” and those typified by a “Discourse of Disunity.”5 Included within
the “Discourse of Unity” are both “denial” (of a “tension between
constitutionalism and democracy”) and “reconciliation” (of the tension,
resulting in a justification of judicial review).6 Originalists of the various
stripes all fall within the discourse of unity, whether, as Sultany attributes to
Ackerman,7 denying the tension, or, extending Sultany’s argument,
attempting to achieve reconciliation, like Justice Scalia.
For many originalists, asserting the determinacy of constitutional
meaning has been crucial to denying or reconciling the potential tension
between constitutionalism and democracy.
According to this
understanding, unelected judges are authorized to cabin or annul the will of
political representatives as expressed in legislative or executive branch
action only by recourse to a text that, when interpreted correctly—or, in
other words, when employing the proper procedures—states a determinate
constraint articulated by the Founding or amending generation. To the
3. Id. at 19.
4. Contrast, for example, the theoretical account of originalism provided by Justice
Scalia in Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997), with Bruce Ackerman’s vision of constitutional change as
expressed in BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3–33 (1991).
5. Nimer Sultany, The State of Progressive Constitutional Theory: The Paradox of
Constitutional Democracy and the Project of Political Justification, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 371, 377 (2012).
6. Id. at 377.
7. Id. at 377, 399–402.
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extent that ambiguity or uncertainty remains upon application of the right
interpretive principles, these originalists argue that courts should not
intervene and should instead let political determinations lie. By contrast, a
number of those falling within the “New Originalist” camp instead
acknowledge that the meaning of much constitutional text cannot be
definitively resolved from an originalist perspective.8
The recommendation of these scholars is not, however, to dwell on the
various meanings recoverable in light of originalist interpretation but
instead to resort to some form of what Keith Whittington has called
“construction”—whether by judges or by actors in the political branches—
in developing an account of how the Constitution should apply in the
present.9 These writers hence advocate turning to current politics once
confronted with the possibility of constitutional indeterminacy. As this
Symposium Article contends, the move from the indeterminacy of original
meaning straight to contemporary construction is satisfactory neither as an
account of interpretation nor as a matter of democracy.
Many originalists have, so far, taken one of the premises of the
countermajoritarian difficulty for granted—the notion that the majoritarian
electoral process should constitute the dominant means of securing
democracy within our system, as within any democratic system. To the
extent that figures like Ackerman or, more recently, Michael Rappaport and
8. Several accounts have been given of what constitutes “the New Originalism” or,
more broadly, “New Originalisms.” James Fleming has recently observed that Keith
Whittington, Lawrence Solum, and even Justice Scalia, Ronald Dworkin, and Jack Balkin
have characterized themselves or been characterized as New Originalists. Under such a
broad definition, he argues, “new originalism . . . is a family of theories, not one unified
view.” James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1785,
1788–94 (2013) (quotation marks omitted).
Despite the diversity of scholars and approaches, some have attempted to furnish a
concrete set of criteria for recognizing New Originalism. Hence, Lawrence Solum suggests
that New Originalists adhere to four theses, the second and fourth of which do not apply to
other kinds of originalists:
 The fixation thesis: The linguistic meaning of the constitutional text was
fixed at the time each provision was framed and ratified.
 The public meaning thesis: Constitutional meaning is fixed by the
understanding of the words and phrases and the grammar and syntax that
characterized the linguistic practices of the public and not by the intentions of
the framers.
 The textual constraint thesis: The original meaning of the text of the
Constitution has legal force: the text is law and not a mere symbol.
 The interpretation-construction distinction: Constitutional practice includes
two distinct activities: (1) constitutional interpretation, which discerns the
linguistic meaning of the text, and (2) constitutional construction, which
determines the legal effect of the text.
Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B.
SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 4 (2011). Similarly distinguishing
new from old originalism, Keith Whittington has claimed that “the new originalism . . . is
more concerned with providing the basis for positive constitutional doctrine than the basis
for subverting doctrine,” that it “is less likely to emphasize a primary commitment to judicial
restraint,” and that it “is focused less on the concrete intentions of individual drafters of
constitutional text than on the public meaning of the text that was adopted.” Keith E.
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 608–09 (2004).
9. See infra notes 20–21, 34–39 and accompanying text.
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John McGinnis have suggested that the role of the Constitution in our
system demonstrates the purchase of a different democratic vision, they
have relied on the notion that constitutional settlements entail the
concurrence of a broader constituency than ordinary legislation, and, hence,
should be deferred to in cases of conflict.10 This kind of “dualist
democracy,” as Ackerman has called it, juxtaposes the time of regular
politics with the exceptional moments when constitutions or constitutional
changes are produced.11
The focus in extant originalist accounts on majoritarianism and more
unified conceptions of “the people” or supermajorities is, this Article
argues, misguided. Not only does it underestimate the role of political
dissensus within the governmental system that the Constitution itself
establishes—as witnessed by the distribution of powers and capabilities
among a broad range of constitutional actors—but it also forces originalists
to ignore or work around the substantial disagreements among the members
of the Founding generation. These disagreements pertained not simply to
questions that the Constitution ultimately resolved, but rather to the very
meaning of constitutional terms. Taking seriously the challenge to
justifications of originalism posed by dissensus, one can reconstruct the
value of originalism as a domain of contested meanings—contested not
simply as a matter of present democracy, but also as a function of a
democracy that has endured and possesses awareness of its own
temporality, the possibility of which is precisely what critics of democracy
from Athens onward have denied.
Some might argue that, even if it were democratically desirable to accept
the contested meanings of constitutional terms, such contested meanings do
not, as a matter of interpretation, constitute meanings at all. Hence, Stanley
Fish’s recent work contends that original meaning originalism carries no
meaning at all, because meaning derives only from intentional
communications by authors.12 Were the Constitution to be discovered
millennia in the future and thought to have been created by a random set of
typographical accidents, the possible interpreters would be correct to treat it
as simply nonsense rather than as a potential carrier of meaning. Fish
concludes from this that the Constitution can only mean what it was
intended to mean—although he also specifies that this theoretical
conclusion says nothing about how one should go about discerning that
intent. Even accepting the priority Fish places on original intent, however,
one can justify interpreting the Constitution as a document of contested
signification. There is nothing about meaning that requires it to be unitary
to exist.

10. See ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 3–33. See generally John O. McGinnis & Michael
B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693 (2010) (arguing
that the supermajoritarian process of constitutional creation led to many of the virtues of the
U.S. Constitution).
11. ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 3–33.
12. See infra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
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In Part I, this Article articulates the role of determinacy in originalism as
it has been practiced. Part II turns to the democratic justifications for
focusing on the disparate meanings furnished by the common law backdrop
of the Constitution. Part III then defends the interpretive proposition that
constitutional clauses can maintain multiple meanings.
I. DETERMINACY IN ORIGINALISM
The significance of an originalist insistence on determinacy can be
gleaned from the contrast between Justice Kennedy’s opinion, writing for
the Court, in the 2008 habeas corpus case of Boumediene v. Bush13 and
Justice Scalia’s dissent in that same case. The decision arose from
challenges to the Military Commissions Act’s attempt to remove the
pending habeas corpus cases of aliens detained as enemy combatants from
the jurisdiction of the federal courts.14 The Court determined that the
petitioners, Guantánamo Bay detainees, could assert a right under the
Suspension Clause of the Constitution against this provision of the Military
Commissions Act,15 despite the fact that the Founding-era history of habeas
corpus could not definitively answer the question of whether the writ would
have extended to Guantánamo Bay under the common law.16 Part of the
resolution of the case thus depended on the justices’ decision about how to
treat conflicting and sometimes absent common law evidence. According
to Justice Kennedy,
[The] arguments [of both the petitioners and the Government] are
premised . . . upon the assumption that the historical record is complete
and that the common law, if properly understood, yields a definite answer
to the questions before us. There are reasons to doubt both assumptions.
Recent scholarship points to the inherent shortcomings in the historical
record. And given the unique status of Guantanamo Bay and the
particular dangers of terrorism in the modern age, the common-law courts
simply may not have confronted cases with close parallels to this one.
We decline, therefore, to infer too much, one way or the other, from the
lack of historical evidence on point.17

Although Justice Kennedy here points to the lack of historical
documentation and the fact that exact parallels to contemporary
circumstances might not have been present in the Founding era, his
comments could equally apply to situations in which the common law
evidence of various relevant jurisdictions cut in different directions. In that
case as well, Justice Kennedy might have insisted that the lack of
determinacy in the historical evidence should not itself be outcome
determinative.
Because he concludes that the common law record is insufficient to
establish a determinate eighteenth-century understanding of the reach of
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

553 U.S. 723 (2008).
Id. at 732–33, 735–37.
Id. at 771.
Id. at 752.
Id. (citation omitted).
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habeas corpus to territories analogous to Guantánamo Bay, Justice
Kennedy’s lengthy review of the historical scope of habeas corpus carries
few implications for the ultimate test he establishes in Boumediene.
Instead, he invokes the U.S. Supreme Court’s own prior precedents—
including, most prominently, Johnson v. Eisentrager,18 a case involving
German war criminals held in a prison that the United States administered
in Germany—to generate a set of factors that should be weighed in deciding
whether the writ of habeas corpus runs to any particular location.19
This method appears consistent with a New Originalist norm of
constitutional construction. As Keith Whittington explains it, construction
takes up where interpretation leaves off: “Constructions do not pursue a
preexisting if deeply hidden meaning in the founding document; rather, they
elucidate the text in the interstices of discoverable, interpretive meaning,
where the text is so broad or so underdetermined as to be incapable of
faithful but exhaustive reduction to legal rules.”20 In the face of the
indeterminacy of the results of interpretation, construction fills in the
gaps.21 Similarly, under Justice Kennedy’s view in Boumediene, the
indefiniteness of the answer that the common law yields to the question of
the scope of the writ of habeas corpus requires turning to other sources and
other modes of reasoning to generate factors for constitutional analysis.
By contrast, Justice Scalia insists in Boumediene upon an
unreconstructed version of originalism, one opposed to any claims for the
role of constitutional construction—at least as practiced by the judiciary.
Responding to the majority’s arguments about the weight of history, Justice
Scalia maintains:
In light of [the] principles of deference [to Congress’s view that a law it
has passed is constitutional], the Court’s conclusion that ‘the common law
[does not] yiel[d] a definite answer to the questions before us,’ leaves it
no choice but to affirm the Court of Appeals. The writ as preserved in the
Constitution could not possibly extend farther than the common law
provided when that Clause was written. The Court admits that it cannot
determine whether the writ historically extended to aliens held abroad,
and it concedes (necessarily) that Guantanamo Bay lies outside the
sovereign territory of the United States. Together, these two concessions
establish that it is (in the Court’s view) perfectly ambiguous whether the
common-law writ would have provided a remedy for these petitioners. If
that is so, the Court has no basis to strike down the Military Commissions
Act, and must leave undisturbed the considered judgment of the co-equal
branches.22

18. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
19. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
20. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 5 (1999).
21. Notably, under Whittington’s account, it is largely the political branches, not the
courts, that engage in construction. See infra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. Other
theories like Jack Balkin’s that rely on the interpretation-construction distinction, however,
allow for a larger judicial role in the process of construction.
22. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 832–33 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Although Justice Scalia refers to the Court’s customary principles of
deference to Congress, it is a short step from here to the notion he has
frequently reiterated that the Court must defer to the elected branches when
the Constitution does not dictate a contrary result. Hence, in any cases of
constitutional ambiguity, Congress’s judgment should supplant the Court’s.
If, for Justice Kennedy, the fact that the common law of the Founding era
did not dictate constitutional meaning meant that constitutional construction
could take over, for Justice Scalia, it suggested that the Constitution’s role
in the matter—at least as judicially implemented—was at an end. Although
the political branches might legitimately engage in constitutional
construction, such an act is precisely that which judges must
conscientiously avoid when interpreting the Constitution.
This conclusion flows inevitably from the significance of the role of
originalism as a constraint on judges in Justice Scalia’s interpretive theory.
As Jack Balkin has summarized this position, dubbing it “skyscraper
originalism,” “skyscraper originalism views following correct interpretive
methodology as the central constraint on judges,” neglecting the possible
role of other institutional constraints.23 The vision of originalism as
restraining otherwise rampant judicial overreaching is rooted in the
countermajoritarian difficulty. As Barry Friedman’s apt title of one part of
his history of the countermajoritarian difficulty—The Birth of an Academic
Obsession24—suggests, the quandary has preoccupied constitutional
theorists at least for the fifty years since Alexander Bickel’s formulation of
the problem in 1962 in The Least Dangerous Branch (which had its fiftieth
anniversary just last year).25 Of course, many brilliant efforts have
attempted to resolve the difficulty. Two approaches are of particular
interest here.
First, in We the People, Bruce Ackerman indicates a particular value of
the Constitution for democracy rather than simply for the liberal articulation
of rights.26 According to his dualist theory of democracy, higher law is
created during particular periods or constitutional moments—including the
Founding era, Reconstruction, and the New Deal—and must be preserved
from the incursions of temporary legislative majorities during the
intervening eras. This higher law is not imposed by fiat from above, but is
posited by the people themselves. It is the role of the courts to maintain the
principles of higher law during the eras intervening between constitutional
moments. Hence the judiciary protects the will of “the people” against the
views of transient majorities.27

23. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 22 (2011).
24. Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
25. BICKEL, supra note 2.
26. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 4.
27. Michael Rappaport and John McGinnis’s arguments in favor of construing the
Constitution as enshrining a preference for supermajorities can be read as another variant on
the dualist democracy theme. Although they have written extensively about this idea, they
encapsulate it most succinctly in Our Supermajoritarian Constitution:
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Second, for Justice Stephen Breyer, the courts not only help to serve
democracy by deferring to the political branches but can also democratize
themselves. As he writes in the introduction to Active Liberty: Interpreting
Our Democratic Constitution,
[M]y thesis . . . finds in the Constitution’s democratic objective not
simply restraint on judicial power or an ancient counterpart of more
modern protection, but also a source of judicial authority and an
interpretive aid to more effective protection of ancient and modern liberty
alike. . . . [I]ncreased emphasis upon that [democratic] objective by
judges when they interpret a legal text will yield better law.28

Under this view, judges implement democracy not simply by enforcing
constitutional meaning, but by attempting to actualize the democratic
decisionmaking of the contemporary moment.
These two approaches represent two poles of justification for judicial
review in the face of the countermajoritarian difficulty. One argument
insists upon the democratic credentials of the Constitution itself, and, in a
derivative sense, of the judiciary reviewing political branch actions for
constitutionality. The other makes an implicit or explicit claim that the
legitimacy of the Constitution rests in the hands of present citizens who
accept it, and maintains, therefore, that judges should espouse a living
constitutionalism that gives shape to a more contemporary democratic
vision.
There are significant problems, I would contend, with both of these
approaches. With respect to the former, the Ackermanian vision of “we the
people” resonates with the heritage of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and his
invocation of the “general will.”29 If we interpret Ackerman’s account of
the Constitution as a version in miniature of Rousseau’s argument about
This Article proposes a new theory of the Constitution. We argue that the
central principle underlying the Constitution is governance through supermajority
rules. More specifically, the Constitution embraces supermajority rules as a means
of improving legislative decisionmaking in various circumstances where majority
rule would operate poorly. Supermajoritarianism is thus a means of promoting the
more general constitutional principle of republicanism, which attempts to promote
the public good within a system of popular representation. The super-majoritarian
principle is central both to an accurate description of the Constitution and to the
proper understanding of the normative reasons why the Constitution binds us.
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 703, 705 (2002). This article points to supermajoritarian aspects of the creation and
ratification of the Constitution (including the fact that twelve of the thirteen states supported
convening a constitutional convention and that nine of the thirteen were obliged to approve
the Constitution before it went into effect), the inclusion of supermajority requirements in
various constitutional clauses, and the stringent constraints on constitutional amendment. Id.
at 705, 709, 710–17, 780–90.
28. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
6 (2005).
29. Rousseau’s classic formulation of the “general will” in The Social Contract
explicitly subordinates majoritarianism to consensus. As Rousseau writes, “The law of
majority rule is itself something established by convention, and presupposes unanimity at
least once.” JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Of the Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND
OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 39, 49 (Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans., 1997) (1762).
For Ackerman’s indebtedness to Rousseau, see Sultany, supra note 5, at 399–401.
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entrance into the social compact, we can see the American individual as,
like the Rousseauvian citizen (in Daniel Bensaïd’s gloss), “put[ting] his
person ‘under the supreme direction of the general will,’” and “becom[ing]
‘an indivisible part of the whole.’”30 “The cost,” as Daniel Bensaïd has
claimed, of this model “is an exacerbated holism.”31 By imagining that we
are part of “the people,” we are forced to live out a fiction that may be
useful when it comes to the justifications for entering into society but less
helpful when it pertains to following the Constitution.
With respect to the latter, it may furnish a perfectly fine model for
judging, but it does not account for the role of the Constitution within our
political scheme, apart from its capacity to indicate certain values of liberty
that we could also glean from almost any other modern legal document.
Even one of the most thoroughgoing proponents of living constitutionalism,
David Strauss, does not defend this position fully. Instead, when
advocating for applying a common law interpretive model in the area of
constitutional interpretation, he refutes the contention that the common law
method is undemocratic by instead claiming that it is the Constitution itself
that is undemocratic because it will and should sometimes thwart
majorities.32 Here the problem rests not in the conception of the people as a
fictional unity but instead in the vision of democracy as exclusively
connoting the rule of majorities within the present.
If the forms of originalism advocated by figures as disparate as Justice
Scalia and Ackerman rely on the notion that the special democratic origins
of the Constitution legitimize the constraints that it imposes on the
statutorily expressed will of legislative majorities, the corollary for at least
some originalists is that this legitimacy ends once the meaning of particular
constitutional clauses becomes demonstrably less than certain. Justice
Scalia himself has perhaps most clearly propounded this position in cases
like Boumediene and others. In light of the ambiguity of common law
meanings, Justice Scalia generally advocates adopting what he deems the
dominant view in the states at the time of the Founding, if such a dominant
view can be discerned. For example, in the Confrontation Clause case of
Crawford v. Washington, he distinguished most of the Founding-era
evidence Chief Justice William Rehnquist had furnished contrary to Justice
Scalia’s own position on the original meaning of the provision and claimed,
“The only timely authority the Chief Justice cites . . . provides no
substantial support.”33 If no determinate meaning seems forthcoming, as in
Boumediene, Justice Scalia indicates that decisionmaking should be left to
the political branches.
New Originalists instead place more weight both on the possibility that
the Constitution might not be as determinate as Justice Scalia often
contends, and on the mechanisms for implementing the Constitution in light
30. Daniel Bensaïd, Permanent Scandal, in DEMOCRACY IN WHAT STATE? 16, 28 (Amy
Allen ed., William McCuaig trans., 2011).
31. Id. at 29.
32. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 47 (2010).
33. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 n.5 (2004) (citations omitted).
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of this lack of fixity. As Keith Whittington explains towards the end of
Constitutional Interpretation,
If originalism is theoretically possible, and in fact required to ground the
practice of judicial review, it remains practically difficult. As critics have
pointed out, the record of the founders’ intent is less extensive and clear
than might be desired. Although the broad outlines of the constitutional
meaning may be reasonably clear, interpretation of the text often falls
short of providing clear guidance in making the fine distinctions required
to settle contemporary disputes. . . . In such cases, the founders could
reasonably be said to have no intent relevant to a given question, and thus
constitutional law has no determinate answer to provide.34

In responding to this situation, Whittington insists both that it means
interpretation is at an end, and that the Constitution still remains relevant
through the “political constitution,” which “requires a process of
construction to add to the text to realize its suggested meaning.”35
According to Whittington’s vision, “It is a necessary and essential
political task, regardless of the particular institution exercising that
function, to construct a determinate constitutional meaning to guide
government practice.”36 Significantly, the moments he addresses in
Constitutional Construction relied on the political branches to effectuate
constitutional change rather than on the judiciary. As he writes of the
episodes he discusses, “these constructions did not depend on judicial
review for their enforcement. They altered constitutional practices but
barely affected judicial doctrine.”37 Recently, Jack Balkin has brought
construction squarely back into judicial decisionmaking in Living
Originalism. As Balkin claims, “[T]he processes of constitutional change
are primarily the work of constitutional construction, involving both the
political branches and the courts. . . . It is a ‘democratic constitutionalism,’
to use Post and Siegel’s expression, because constitutional doctrine is
responsive, over time, to a wide variety of political and cultural forces.”38
In particular, under a living originalist account, judicial interpretations of
the Constitution respond to the pressure of social movements; hence, “[t]he
system of living constitutionalism . . . maintains the benefits of

34. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 211 (1999).
35. Id. Whittington emphasizes elsewhere that the New Originalism is focused less on
judicial restraint than on articulating a positive vision of the constitutional rights that judges
should promote, and that it has concomitantly deemphasized the countermajoritarian
problem facing judicial review. See Whittington, supra note 8. Nevertheless, he generally
advocates construction by the political branches, just as a number of more traditional
originalists “have converged on the prescription that constitutional ambiguities mandate
judicial deference to ‘current democratic majorities’ and, therefore, judicial abstinence.”
Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities and Originalism: Lessons from the Spending
Power, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 495, 499 (2009).
36. WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 6.
37. Id. at 218.
38. BALKIN, supra note 23, at 320.
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constitutionalism while allowing adjustments in interpretation over time in
the face of sustained democratic mobilization.”39
When originalists like Justice Scalia insisted on their method of
interpretation as a solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty, they were
obliged to posit the determinacy of large swaths of constitutional text in
order to undertake judicial review in a manner they deemed democratically
justifiable. New Originalists have instead acknowledged a greater role for
the ambiguity and multiplicity of constitutional meanings and, as a result,
distinguish between interpretation and construction. By turning to
construction rather than interpretation, however, they have, in the process,
discounted the significance of the contested meanings of the Constitution
within the Founding era and neglected the import—both interpretively and
democratically—of those contested meanings for understanding the
Constitution in the present.
As the following Part aims to show, an insistence on meaning as unified,
and on the impossibility of interpreting once the postulate of unity has been
undermined, resonates with a theory of politics emanating more from
Thomas Hobbes’s notion of sovereignty than from other accounts of
democracy or law.40 Adopting this vision of meaning impoverishes our
understanding of the kind of democracy upon which our constitutional
tradition rests and that which our Constitution itself makes possible.
II. DEMOCRACY AND CONTESTED MEANINGS
Well before the Founding era, Thomas Hobbes, whose late seventeenthcentury philosophical controversies with John Locke are often seen as the
commencement of the liberal tradition, addressed the quandary posed by the
effort to reconcile political stability with the possibility of divergent
interpretations. As Philip Pettit has argued in Made with Words: Hobbes
on Language, Mind, and Politics,41 for Hobbes, the human capacity to
employ language both creates and solves man’s fundamental problem.42
According to Pettit’s summary:
Although human beings are born in animal quietude, the invention of
words leads them into inevitable strife, putting them at motivational
loggerheads and making it impossible for them to agree on any common,
normative currency for the regulation of their affairs. But the invention of
39. Id. at 327–28.
40. The status of democracy in Hobbes’s own work has been hotly contested; although
many have associated him with a defense of monarchy that is incompatible with democracy,
scholars like Richard Tuck have recently made strong cases that Hobbes’s theories hold
important implications for our democracy. Hence, Tuck argues that Hobbes sets forth an
influential account of “despotic democracy.” See Richard Tuck, Hobbes and Democracy, in
RETHINKING THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 171, 171–90 (Annabel
Brett, James Tully & Holly Hamilton-Bleakley eds., 2006). Whether or not Hobbes is
viewed as a democratic theorist is less significant for the purposes of this Article than is the
despotic quality of the political arrangement he describes.
41. PHILIP PETTIT, MADE WITH WORDS: HOBBES ON LANGUAGE, MIND, AND POLITICS
(2009).
42. Id. at 115.
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words provides the solution for the very problem it creates, enabling
human beings to enter into a contract for incorporation that creates a
sovereign sufficiently powerful to embody the commonwealth: “that
great Leviathan,” “that Mortal God to which we owe, under the Immortal
God, our peace and defence.”43

While words furnish a source of conflict within the second, verbal state of
nature, they also allow for the creation of the political contract. The power
and unity of the sovereign proves crucial for the stable deployment of
language within the constituted polity, as well. Hobbes emphasizes the
sovereign’s role in legislating and, in particular, in implementing legislation
that has “a constitutive as well as regulative character,”44 in other words,
legislation that “will first introduce new terms or concepts, and so new
possibilities of behavior, and then regulate for how these should materialize
in social life.”45 Because no objectively correct interpretation of certain
terms exists,
the sovereign is to establish the conventional meanings of a range of
terms: not just “what is to be called right, what good, what virtue,” but
also “what much, what little . . . what a pound, what a quart,” what even
in deformed or premature births is to be called “a man”; in all these
matters, as in matters of ownership, “private judgments may differ, and
beget controversy.”46

Under this account, language enables entrance into the social contract, but
the very establishment of that contract entails the placement of a sovereign
in charge of deterring interpretive controversies and settling those that arise
despite all efforts to ward them off. Notwithstanding his view that
monarchy constitutes the best form of government, Hobbes purports here to
be speaking in more general terms of all political forms.47
Put this way, Hobbes’s account of the relation between language and
sovereignty bears a substantial resemblance to originalist justifications of
judicial review in the face of the countermajoritarian difficulty. If one
substitutes “Constitution” for “legislation” in Pettit’s account of Hobbes,
the sovereign’s duty becomes that of establishing a Constitution, then
ensuring the fixity of the meaning of its terms. Under a conventional
originalist account, that would entail having “the people” (as sovereign)
ratify the Constitution, then appointing a Supreme Court as the people’s
transtemporal sovereign representative in announcing authoritative
interpretations of the Constitution. Sovereignty here is intimately bound up
with the insistence on determinate meaning.

43. Id. (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 17, para. 13 (Edwin Curley ed.,
Hackett Pub. Co. 1994) (1651)).
44. Id. at 130.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 131 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, HUMAN NATURE AND DE CORPORE POLITICO:
THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, NATURAL AND POLITIC ch. 29, para. 8 (Oxford Univ. Press 1994)
(1651)).
47. Id. at 110.
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An alternative position might entail viewing such a forceful sovereign as
unnecessary once the relevant legislation or Constitution were put in place,
because the meaning of its terms should not be subject to such deep
contestation. On this account, the “private judgments” that might cause
controversy would simply constitute erroneous interpretations, errors that
would be apparent to the vast majority of observers. Hobbes was, however,
concerned not simply with individuals’ deviant “private judgments,” but
also with more thoroughgoing divergences of meaning, particularly those
insisted upon by his early seventeenth-century adversary, Sir Edward Coke.
As Hobbes recognized in his A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a
Student of the Common Laws of England, Coke’s writings posed a
substantial challenge to the political unification of meaning by positing a
specialized understanding of those trained in the “artificial reason” of the
common law.48 Different degrees of expertise might undergird varying
versions of particular terms.
Rendered in originalist terms, this issue appears as that of the “division of
linguistic labor,” which Lawrence Solum has artfully unpacked.49 Those
opposing a Hobbesian solution might argue, in accordance with this
division of linguistic meaning, that specialized terms should simply carry
their specialized meaning. This appears to be the answer to which
Whittington appeals, asserting that “legal writing, of which the Constitution
is an example for the judiciary, is more contextualized than the literary
writing around which indeterminacy theories developed.”50 Here the
existence of specialized meanings not only poses no impediment to
constitutional interpretation, but further limits the possibilities for
ambiguity within constitutional provisions.
As I have attempted to demonstrate elsewhere, however, recourse to
specialized meanings and, in particular, common law meanings of
constitutional terms, does not, in many instances, settle the Founding-era
import of various constitutional clauses.51 Those in different states had
disparate understandings of what it might mean for an accused to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, as the Sixth Amendment

48. See THOMAS HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND STUDENT OF THE
COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND 54–57 (Joseph Cropsey ed., Univ. of Chi. 1971) (1681).
49. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 8, at 34–35 (“[T]here are some words and phrases in the
Constitution that seem to have technical meanings. For example, it might be the case that
the phrase letters of marque and reprisal would have been familiar to seamen, officials, and
admiralty lawyers but almost unknown to the general public. If this is the case, it might
seem that this provision lacks public meaning. To solve this problem, we can borrow an idea
from the philosophy of language, which recognizes that the meaning of some words and
phrases is conveyed via the division of linguistic labor. Thus a Massachusetts farmer who
encountered the phrase letters of marque and reprisal might say ‘That sounds like a term of
art. I’d better consult a lawyer or judge if I want to know what it means.’”). For a more
technical discussion of the division of linguistic labor, see also Lawrence B. Solum,
Semantic Originalism 56–58 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Papers Series, Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244.
50. WHITTINGTON, supra note 34, at 90.
51. See generally Meyler, supra note 1.
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requires, or what “equity” connoted within the text of the Seventh
Amendment. If one accepts that these disparate individuals ratified a text
interpreted according to their own assumptions about its connotations, one
would imagine a Constitution that meant different things to different
people, even at the time of the Founding. This originary contestation about
meaning is consistent not with a unified “We the People,” or even a
majoritarian account, but instead with a fundamentally contestatory notion
of the democratic foundations of the Constitution. The divisions within
democracy rather than consensus or majority rule are foregrounded by
bringing forward and emphasizing contested original meanings.
The resistance to accepting these aspects of original meaning derives in
part from the dominant models of democracy that inform the
countermajoritarian difficulty and the originalist responses—those of
majoritarianism or of a Rousseauvian vision of “the people”—formulated in
response to the majoritarian emphasis. Taking the long view of democracy,
the focus on majorities seems less inevitable. Certainly, as a number of
critics have recently reminded us, decision by lot seemed more central to
the ancient conception of democracy than an idea of election.52 While we
might resist the notion—except in the context of juries—that aleatory
processes should represent a central component of our democratic vision,
the principle of selection by lot should remind us that the notion of majority
rule does not have to be integral to a conception of democracy. Displacing
focus away from majoritarianism allows instead for the emergence of the
significance of contestation within democracy.
Along these lines, Chantal Mouffe has proposed an “agonistic”
(adversary oriented)—as opposed to “antagonistic” (enemy oriented)—
account of modern democracy. This account would not attempt to reconcile
what she deems the paradoxical relation of democracy and liberalism, as
Rawlsian theory or Habermasian deliberative democracy do, but instead to
acknowledge it. As Mouffe contends:
One of the keys to the thesis of agonistic pluralism is that, far from
jeopardizing democracy, agonistic confrontation is in fact its very
condition of existence. Modern democracy’s specificity lies in the
recognition and legitimation of conflict and the refusal to suppress it by
imposing an authoritarian order.
Breaking with the symbolic
representation of society as an organic body—which was characteristic of

52. See, e.g., JACQUES RANCIÈRE, HATRED OF DEMOCRACY 40 (2006) (explaining that the
“scandal” of Athenian democracy lies in “the choice of the god of chance, the drawing of
lots, i.e., the democratic procedure by which a people of equals decides the distribution of
places”); Oliver Dowlen, The Modern Revival of an Old Idea, in SORTITION: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 3, 3–4 (Gil Delannoi & Oliver Dowlen eds., 2010) (“[S]ortition [or] the use of
random selection . . . in the public or political arena to choose people or allocate goods . . .
may be new to today’s politics but was systematically used in Ancient Athens and in late
medieval Italy—two formative periods in the development of what we know as politics or
the political process—and in many other places besides.”).
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The key to moving from antagonism to agonism consists in the
identification of “adversaries,” “the opponent with whom one shares a
common allegiance to the democratic principles of ‘liberty and equality for
all,’ while disagreeing about their interpretation.”54 Crucial to the
construction of an adversary relationship is each participant’s act of
refraining from “put[ting] into question the legitimacy of their opponent’s
right to fight for the victory of their position.”55
Within an agonistic system, reconciliation remains impossible, yet the
presence of irreducible pluralism must not frustrate action. Hence the
moment of decision becomes crucial for Mouffe—a decision that does not
represent a final and unquestionable verdict but a provisional step. Mouffe
writes that
to institute an order, frontiers need to be drawn and the moment of closure
must be faced. But this frontier is the result of a political decision; it is
constituted on the basis of a particular we/they, and for that very reason it
should be recognized as something contingent and open to contestation.56

The practice of agonism means, for Mouffe, that “the specificity of modern
pluralist democracy—even a well-ordered one—does not reside in the
absence of domination and of violence but in the establishment of a set of
institutions through which they can be limited and contested.”57 Under her
account, however, these institutions do not seem to include a constitution.
Furthermore, Mouffe objects to the privileging of the juridical sphere,
deeming this phenomenon a symptom of “the growing impossibility of
envisaging the problems of society in a properly political way.”58 Hence,
the requisite decision must take place outside the judicial arena.
Despite this dismissal of the judicial in favor of the political, Mouffe
furnishes no reasons why agonistic democracy could not be practiced in the
area of constitutionalism itself. Indeed, a work she relies on extensively in
elaborating her conception of democracy—James Tully’s Strange
Multiplicity—itself considers constitutional systems rather than politics per
53. CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 103 (2000) [hereinafter MOUFFE,
PARADOX]; see also CHANTAL MOUFFE, AGONISTICS: THINKING THE WORLD POLITICALLY 118 (2013) [hereinafter MOUFFE, AGONISTICS].
54. MOUFFE, AGONISTICS, supra note 53, at 7.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 17.
57. MOUFFE, PARADOX, supra note 53, at 22. Mouffe writes similarly in Agonostics:
Thinking the World Politically:
A pluralist perspective informed by the agonistic approach . . . recognizes that
divergences can be at the origin of conflicts, but it asserts that those conflicts
should not necessarily lead to a “clash of civilizations.” It suggests that the best
way to avoid such a situation is the establishment of a multipolar institutional
framework that would create the conditions for those conflicts to manifest
themselves as agonistic confrontations between adversaries, instead of taking the
form of antagonistic struggles between enemies.
MOUFFE, AGONISTICS, supra note 53, at 41.
58. MOUFFE, PARADOX, supra note 53, at 115.
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se.59 Tully invokes the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein to suggest that the
contestation at the heart of constitutionalism derives from a constitutive
feature of language and fatally undermines modern constitutional theory’s
quest for uniformity.
According to Tully, “[T]he language of
constitutionalism . . . is a labyrinth of terms and their uses from various
periods,” with an “irreducible multiplicity of concrete usage.”60 The
analysis of language that Tully finds in Wittgenstein he connects with that
of the common law. As he writes,
Since the practical form of reasoning Wittgenstein describes is akin to
the reasoning in individual cases at the common law, . . . it is not
surprising that similar arguments were presented by one of the greatest
common lawyers, Chief Justice Matthew Hale, against one of the
founding theorists of modern constitutionalism, Thomas Hobbes.61

Here we return full circle to the debate between Hobbes and the common
lawyers over the nature of language and its significance for the polity.
While Tully highlights the significance of linguistic contestation in the
constitutional context, he concentrates largely on the capacity of different
identity groups to achieve recognition rather than on the act of
interpreting constitutional language. Reading constitutional provisions as
fundamentally contested could, however, allow for the judicial opening of a
more general public conversation about the Constitution, one that would
encourage an agonistic model of democracy to flourish. In particular,
focusing on the original contestation over meaning in the constitutional
context reveals the extent to which agonism does not simply represent a
newer feature of our constitutional system, but has been entrenched within
it from the beginning. Furthermore, uncovering the variant Founding-era
significations of constitutional clauses takes seriously the notion that the
Constitution actually says something; rather than simply envisioning the
Constitution as a framework for ongoing agonistic discussion, it permits
consideration of the Constitution as a repository of meanings. This could
only be the case, however, if the diversity of Founding era meanings did not
undermine the very possibility that the Constitution could mean anything at
all, the claim addressed by the following Part.

59. See id. at 60–77 (endorsing Tully’s reliance on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein to
understand the agonistic role of language within the polity); JAMES TULLY, STRANGE
MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY 103–15 (1995) [hereinafter
TULLY, MULTIPLICITY] (elaborating how a Wittgensteinian approach to language practices
can assist in moving beyond what Tully criticizes as the “uniformity” of modern
constitutionalism); see also 1 JAMES TULLY, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY:
DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL FREEDOM 135–59 (2008) [hereinafter TULLY, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY]
(espousing his own version of agonism in a chapter on “[t]he agonistic freedom of citizens”).
60. TULLY, MULTIPLICITY, supra note 59, at 104–05; see also 1 TULLY, PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 59, at 39–70 (explaining how Wittgenstein’s account of language
demonstrates the flaws both in Jürgen Habermas’s efforts to “establish a framework of
argument that is itself beyond argumentation” and in Charles Taylor’s reliance on
interpretation as “the essential feature of personhood” and provides an alternative means for
moving forward through critical reflection).
61. TULLY, MULTIPLICITY, supra note 59, at 113.
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III. THE MEANING OF CONTESTED MEANINGS
A number of theorists who espouse intentionalist positions on
constitutional interpretation contend that the demonstrated existence of
disparate intentions underwriting a constitutional clause would fatally
undermine the possibility of the relevant language meaning anything.62
Hence, Whittington claims, “To the extent that the founders could
genuinely not achieve a common understanding as to the meaning of
particular textual provisions, these provisions must necessarily remain
meaningless.”63 Similarly, Richard Kay writes,
While there are aspects of constitution-making that complicate the
inquiry—such as the relatively large number of individuals and the need
for the concurrence of more than one group—the basic idea is still valid.
Without a core of identical meanings shared by all those agreeing, the
concept of decision by majority is meaningless.64

Whereas Whittington asserts as a matter of meaning itself that a lack of
common understanding would vitiate signification, Kay bases his account
of the deficit of enforceable meaning on the majoritarian principle
underpinning the authority of the Constitution. Despite the connections
between the two arguments, they can be disaggregated; while the former
relies on a theoretical position concerning interpretation, the latter depends
on a proposition about legitimacy. As contentions about democracy and
legitimacy have already been addressed, this Part will take up Whittington’s
arguments stemming from the philosophy of language. Although I believe
there are reasons to endorse an original public meaning rather than an
intentionalist version of originalism, this Part focuses on the intentionalist
account since it has furnished the most full-throated denunciation of the
possibility of multiple original meanings. Even under an intentionalist
view, the existence of several different intended meanings of a particular
constitutional provision should not render that portion of the Constitution
meaningless. Regardless of which of the two principal originalist
interpretive postures one adopts, or of whether one believes that the
Constitution means what its authors intended or what its original readers
would have understood, there is no reason rooted in interpretive theory why
several meanings cannot coexist.
Many of the recent revivals of an intentionalist position in the literary
and legal contexts can be traced back to E.D. Hirsch, Jr.’s Validity in
Interpretation.65 For Hirsch, resort to intention becomes necessary
62. This critique was first articulated by Paul Brest in his classic article, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). There,
Brest identified many of the difficulties of attributing a unified intent to the adopters of the
Constitution. Id. at 214–17. The problems that Brest diagnosed furnished some of the
impetus for movement from an “original understanding” to an “original meaning” approach
to originalist constitutional interpretation. See Solum, supra note 8, at 9.
63. WHITTINGTON, supra note 34, at 96.
64. Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 708 (2009).
65. E.D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION (1967).
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precisely because unmoored textual interpretation will lead to an
indeterminacy of meaning. He states that “if the meaning of a text is not
the author’s, then no interpretation can possibly correspond to the meaning
of the text, since the text can have no determinate or determinable
meaning.”66 Elaborating upon this point, Hirsch claims that “no mere
sequence of words can represent an actual verbal meaning with reference to
public norms alone. Referred to these alone, the text’s meaning remains
indeterminate.”67 Only when “we . . . posit a speaker who very likely
means something . . . . does the most usual sense of the word sequence
become the most probable or ‘obvious’ sense.”68 At the same time, Hirsch
is careful to specify what the indeterminacy to be avoided consists in and
what it does not. While ambiguity may be and frequently is inherent in the
meaning of a complicated literary object like a poem, indeterminacy
“denies the self-identity of verbal meaning by suggesting that the meaning
of the text can be one thing and also another, different thing, and also
another.”69
Hirsch presents as an example the relation between several different
critics’ interpretations of Wordsworth’s poem, A Slumber Did My Spirit
Seal.70 While what he calls an “inclusivist” might try to reconcile these
possible readings and the meanings they suggest, meanings rendered
plausible by the ambiguity of the poem itself, failure to determine the
poem’s “relative emphasis” of these meanings constitutes an interpretive
flaw.71 On Hirsch’s account, the two readings are not reconcilable, but
wrong, because each neglects the other; the effort to meld them is
inadequate because “[t]he submeanings of a text are not blocks which can
be brought together additively . . . . [s]ince verbal . . . meaning is a structure
of component meanings.”72 A poem’s ambiguity allows for analysis of its
respective meanings and their order of priority, whereas those positing a
poem’s indeterminacy separate out its meanings as if they bore no structural
relation to each other.73
Despite resuscitating much of Hirsch’s emphasis on the intentionality of
meaning, Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels’s essay, The
66. E.D. Hirsch, Jr., In Defense of the Author, in INTENTION AND INTERPRETATION 11, 14
(Gary Iseminger ed., 1995).
67. Id. at 17.
68. Id. at 17–18.
69. Id. at 15.
70. Id. at 19.
71. Id. at 20–21.
72. Id. at 21.
73. Gary Iseminger has attempted more recently to rescue Hirsch’s claims about
indeterminacy from various critiques, contending that these claims must rest on an
ontological rather than an epistemological basis. For Iseminger, contrary to Hirsch’s
apparent position, an author’s will is not required to ensure the determinacy of a poem but
instead that “[i]ndeterminacy could be resolved . . . by a random process.” Gary Iseminger,
An Intentional Demonstration?, in INTENTION AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 66, at 76,
84. Insisting upon the author as guarantor of the determinacy of a poem entails an
ontological claim that does not involve “find[ing] out which of . . . two contradictory
statements about [a] poem is true” but rather “claims to tell us what makes the true one true.”
Id. at 85.
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Impossibility of Intentionless Meaning, criticizes Hirsch for “imagining a
moment of interpretation before intention is present,” or “the moment at
which the text’s meaning ‘remains indeterminate,’ before such
indeterminacy is cleared up by the addition of authorial intention.”74
Instead, endorsing the work of those philosophers of language who, like
John Searle, insist that “there is no getting away from intentionality,”75 they
maintain that meaning only inheres in intentional utterances; “to deprive
[textual marks] of an author is to convert them into accidental likenesses of
language. They are not, after all, an example of intentionless meaning; as
soon as they become intentionless they become meaningless as well.”76
The search for meaning simply is, for them, the search for intention, and
“[t]he issue of determinacy or indeterminacy is irrelevant.”77
Nevertheless, the problem of indeterminacy returns for many of those
following in Knapp and Michaels’s path, particularly when they confront
the collective dimension of constitutional authorship.78 In several places,
Stanley Fish has addressed the issue briefly, distinguishing, like Hirsch,
between ambiguity and indeterminacy and allowing for the former as a
feature of authorial intention. As Fish writes:
In [certain] instances, ambiguity would be produced, not by the language
but by the intentional context within which it was encountered. It is no
paradox to say that those ambiguities (like the ambiguities of modern
poetry) would be perfectly straightforward; they would capture what the
text precisely means. As Steven Smith observes, “legislators may
sometimes choose to be deliberately ambiguous or vague, but they will
communicate their favored ambiguity as precisely as possible,” for “they

74. Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, The Impossibility of Intentionless Meaning,
in INTENTION AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 66, at 53.
75. Id. at 54.
76. Id. at 55.
77. Id. at 53.
78. It is worth noting here that some of those who believe that meaning must be
intentional depart from the view that the relevant meaning is that with which the author
endows the text. Richard Shusterman argues that
even if we deny with Knapp and Michaels that “there can in fact be intentionless
meanings” and accept their premise that texts seen as “intentionless . . . become
meaningless as well” and thus that in some sense “what is intended and what is
meant are identical,” it still does not follow that “the meaning of a text is simply
identical to the author’s intended meaning.” All that follows is that the meaning of
a text is inseparable from some intention (or group of intentions) or another. But
the necessary meaning-securing intentions could belong to readers of the text
rather than to its original author.
Richard Shusterman, Interpretation, Intention, and Truth, in INTENTION AND
INTERPRETATION, supra note 66, at 67 (quoting Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels,
Against Theory, in AGAINST THEORY 12, 15–17 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1985)). Similarly,
even the return to the connection between determinacy and intention does not preclude a
reception-based account of the determinacy-supplying intents. According to Jerrold
Levinson: “The determinacy in question, I would maintain, can just as easily and reasonably
come from an audience’s best contextually informed hypothesis of authorial intention in a
given passage, all things considered.” Jerrold Levinson, Intention and Interpretation: A Last
Look, in INTENTION AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 66, at 221, 236.
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will want the courts and the public to have the blessing and burden of
their preferred ambiguity, not somebody else’s ambiguity.”79

Both Fish’s and Smith’s descriptions of ambiguity here assume the unity of
intent, whether poetic or legislative. The situation would be different if it
could be demonstrated that a particular group of legislators—or drafters of
the Constitution—endorsed one meaning of a provision, whereas another
group thought it carried quite a different signification, and neither
constituency agreed on the ambiguity (at least explicitly) as a means of
agreeing to disagree. This situation is a common one, as Jeremy Waldron
notes in The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review: “[T]he bland
rhetoric of the Bill of Rights was designed simply to finesse the real and
reasonable disagreements that are inevitable among people who take rights
seriously for long enough to see such a Bill enacted.”80 Although
Waldron’s use of “design” could imply a general intent among the
Constitution’s authors to enshrine ambiguity, it could also entail a less
intentional putting aside of disagreement simply to facilitate consensus on
general language about which most could concur.
In another essay, Fish addresses this problem rather cursorily, simply
claiming that any disparity in intentions among the authors of a collectively
created document results in the existence of several texts rather than a
single one. Hence, he inquires:
[S]uppose different legislators meant something different by the words of
the legislation—the word was “canard” and some were voting for “ducks”
and others for “false stories.” What then? Well, as J.L. Austin might say,
that is an infernal shame, for then you would have two texts and two
meanings and no way of reducing them to one, and you would have to
figure out another way to proceed. This, however, would be an unusual
instance; in most cases a multiauthored text presents no particular
problem to interpreters.81

The concluding casual dismissal of the problems arising from the task of
assessing the meaning of a multiauthored text quickly puts aside the
significant puzzles propounded by game and public choice theorists and
others who have—largely in the legislative rather than the constitutional
context—questioned the viability of an intentional account of the meaning
of collectively produced documents.82 Quite apart from this, however,
79. Stanley Fish, The Intentionalist Thesis Once More, in THE CHALLENGE OF
ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 99, 113 (Grant Huscroft &
Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (quoting Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism, in THE
CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra, at 223,
236).
80. Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346, 1369 (2006).
81. Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 648
(2005).
82. For the classic version of this argument, see Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a
‘They,’ Not an ‘It’: Legislative Intent As Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
For a critique of the claims of public choice theorists from a collective intent vantage point,
see generally Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme
Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205.
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Fish’s account entirely ignores the significance of the fact that the authors
have—intentionally, one might say—chosen to express themselves in one
text.
The consequences of this neglect emerge from his subsequent remarks on
the single author who is not simply attempting to enhance ambiguity in her
work, but is instead genuinely divided in intent about the work being
created. As Fish observes:
There is another possibility; not two persons with different intentions,
but one person with different intentions. . . . Could an author have
contradictory intentions and employ the same words as the vehicle for
both of them? Sure, but in that case we would speak of an author “of two
minds” with each of the minds producing its own text with its own
meaning.83

Here we arrive back at something resembling Hirsch’s example of the
two critical takes on Wordsworth’s poem. For Hirsch, simply adding these
interpretations together could not produce a correct view because doing so
would ignore the structure of the relation between meanings within the
poem.
Acknowledging poetic ambiguity then differs from finding
indeterminacy because in the former case the object is admitted to be
singular whereas in the latter it can be divided into various possible texts.
If we consider in more detail what it means to decompose the work of
Fish’s “author ‘of two minds’” into two texts, it becomes apparent that this
process summarily puts to one side the author’s (intentional) decision to
present her work as unitary.
Imagine a modification of an example that Gary Iseminger uses in his
essay, An Intentional Demonstration?84 There Iseminger considers a letter
in which Gerard Manley Hopkins, upon reading over his poem, expressed
concern that it actually meant something quite different from what he had
intended.85 Suppose that Hopkins had embraced, rather than rejected, this
alternative—and even contrary—meaning, and decided that the poem was
only improved by promulgation with an additional possible sense. This
scenario could be seen as a version of the situation in which the poet is of
two minds, at first intending one meaning, then later endorsing another, as
well. The relevant analogy in the legislative or constitutional context would
presumably consist in the conscious embrace of textual ambiguity, such as
Joseph Grundfest and A.C. Pritchard discuss in their aptly entitled Statutes
with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory
Design and Interpretation.86 With respect to both the individual and
83. Fish, supra note 81, at 648–49.
84. See Iseminger, supra note 73.
85. In the letter to Robert Bridges, Hopkins notes,
One thing disquiets me: I meant “fair fall” to mean fair (fortune be)fall; it has
since struck me that perhaps “fair” is an adjective proper and in the predicate and
can only be used in cases like “fair fall the day,” that is, may the day fall, turn out,
fair. My line will yield a sense that way indeed, but I never meant it so.
Id. at 78.
86. Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders:
The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 628
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collective authors, parsing out separate texts to preserve the unity of
intentional meaning under these circumstances seems to unjustifiably
neglect the choice to present the work as singular, not multiple.
The multiplicity of meanings may not itself be intended, however, when
different constitution drafting or legislative constituencies find the
signification of a particular phrase obvious, and yet each supplies a distinct
“obvious” meaning. In this case too, however, the collective decision to
create a speech act with a certain force cannot be disregarded. A great deal
of ink has been spilled over the nature and reducibility of collective
intention in the sphere of analytic philosophy, and entering fully into the
relevant debates is not possible within the scope of this Article.87
Nevertheless, some of the basic insights that have been elaborated in the
area are relevant here. Much of the discussion of collective intention bears
most upon matters of criminal law rather than those of constitutional or
legislative interpretation, as the focus remains on group activity instead of
the documents or meanings generated out of such activity. Hence, in
elaborating on the existence of collective intention, John Searle writes,
It seems obvious that there really is collective intentional behavior as
distinct from individual intentional behavior. You can see this by
watching a football team execute a pass play or hear it by listening to an
orchestra. Better still, you can experience it by actually engaging in some
group activity in which your own actions are a part of the group action.88

At the same time, Searle identifies collective intention as required for the
consequences of a speech act like the Declaration of Independence. As he
maintains, “Full-blown cooperative collective intentionality . . . is often
necessary for the creation of the institution. Think of the creation of the
United States at the time of the Declaration of Independence, for
example.”89 The cooperative intentionality at work here achieves not just
the production of a document, but also the creation of an institution. This
collective speech act differs from an individual one. When arguing for the
notion that “collective speech acts are really different from and irreducible

(2002) (“Ambiguity serves a legislative purpose. When legislators perceive a need to
compromise they can, among other strategies, ‘obscur[e] the particular meaning of a statute,
allowing different legislators to read the obscured provisions the way they wish.’ Legislative
ambiguity reaches its peak when a statute is so elegantly crafted that it credibly supports
multiple inconsistent interpretations by legislators and judges. Legislators with opposing
views can then claim that they have prevailed in the legislative arena, and, as long as courts
continue to issue conflicting interpretations, these competing claims of legislative victory
remain credible.” (alteration in original) (quoting ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE,
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 779–80 (1997))).
87. See JOHN R. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD: THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN
CIVILIZATION 45–46 (2010) (listing some of the key works, including those by Margaret
Gilbert, Raimo Tuomela, Michael Bratman, Seumas Miller, and David Velleman). See
generally INTENTIONAL ACTS AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTS: ESSAYS ON JOHN SEARLE’S SOCIAL
ONTOLOGY (Savas Tsohatzidis ed., 2007) (rehearsing many of the key debates).
88. John R. Searle, Collective Intentions and Actions, in INTENTIONS IN COMMUNICATION
401, 401 (Philip R. Cohen et al. eds., 1990).
89. SEARLE, supra note 87, at 57.
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to individual speech acts,”90 it is precisely Searle’s category of the
declaration—a speech act aimed at “bring[ing] about a correspondence
between the propositional content of the speech act and reality, i.e., to make
true in the world what is said in the content of the act”91—that Anthonie
Meijers adduces to demonstrate that “Searle’s taxonomy [of speech acts
may] already include[] elements of collective agency.”92 As he notes: “A
case in point is Searle’s category of declarations. Though there may be
exceptional cases of individual declarations—for example, when a speaker
defines a term—most declarations require extralinguistic institutions and
thus collective intentionality and collective agency.”93 Not only the
Declaration of Independence, but the Constitution, too, performs a speech
act. As a declaration, it announces and implements a structured polity,
regardless of the particular nuances of that structure. The collective
element of constitutional creation is crucial to the Constitution’s status as
declaration and presupposes the possibility of collective agency.
Although focusing on group testimony rather than on declarations, and
on our justifications for believing such testimony instead of our
interpretation of its meaning, Deborah Tollefsen valuably elaborates on the
inadequacy of an account of group documentary production that relies
simply on the summing of individual activities. The “summative approach”
would consider that “when a group offers testimony it is really understood
as the testimony of all or some of the members—what they would testify to
if given the opportunity.”94 Pointing out that the research for something
like a United Nations Commission report may have been done by staff not
involved in the drafting process, that some individual members might
remain skeptical of the final results, and that particular people within the
group may only have arrived at views on the topic at hand once they saw
the compiled information, Tollefsen maintains that the summative approach
cannot deal with these problems. Instead,
when a group testifies the source of this testimony is the group itself.
What is required for an assertion to count as the group’s testimony is
some form of sanction that allows an assertion to be that of the group, and
such an assertion must occur within the proper normative context.95

A similar set of points applies to the process of constitution making.
Simply disaggregating the resulting document into a number of disparate
statements by members of a constitutional convention who were unable—or
inadvertently failed—to agree on the meaning of component terms neglects
the sanction that renders the constitution as promulgated a product of the
meeting, a document with a particular legal force, and a speech act intended

90.
FACTS:
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Anthonie Meijers, Collective Speech Acts, in INTENTIONAL ACTS AND INSTITUTIONAL
ESSAYS ON JOHN SEARLE’S SOCIAL ONTOLOGY, supra note 87, at 93, 108.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 108.
Id.
Deborah Tollefsen, Group Testimony, 21 SOC. EPISTEMOLOGY 299, 300 (2007).
Id. at 302.
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to establish a political structure.96 This speech act does not end contestation
over particular clauses by generating either a unitary meaning or none at all,
but instead expresses the intent of the drafters (or ratifiers) to produce a
common polity. Agonism left its mark on the text in the form of the
Founding-era debates over constitutional meaning as much as social
movements’ work to affect constitutional interpretation has brought such
agonism to the fore today. The agonism enshrined in the Constitution itself
does not undermine the possibility of constitutional meaning, but instead
demonstrates that the contestation we live with now only represents the
most recent manifestation of a longstanding constitutional tradition.
CONCLUSION
New Originalists have moved beyond an insistence on determinacy
toward advocating for constitutional construction as a supplement to
interpretation. In doing so, however, many have accepted the proposition
that original meaning cannot exist in the absence of a majority Foundingera view about what that meaning was. This position both undervalues the
feasibility and desirability of interpretation in light of multiple meanings
and rests on a view of democracy that neglects the role of agonism and
dissensus within the polity. Recovering the contested Founding-era
meanings of constitutional provisions instead foregrounds the possibility of
a democracy in which the people agree to make a declaration announcing a
constitutional structure but simultaneously acknowledge—implicitly or
explicitly—the considerable disagreement that persists despite their joint
project. This, I would contend, is our democracy.

96. Although the individuals involved in ratification were more dispersed, the same
analysis of collective intent should apply; the relevant collective intent entailed approving of
a Constitution that would structure a practice of government.

